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This study aims to investigate whether: (1) the change in
debt level is affected by agency problems, the probability of
bankruptcy, firm size, and profitability; (2) the change in debt
level is affected by multinationality (i.e., multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) or domestic corporations (DCs)) and whether
multinationality affects the relationship of agency problems,
probability of bankruptcy, size, and profitability to the change
in debt level. This study finds that in general, the change in debt
level is negatively affected by the probability of bankruptcy and
size. Furthermore, the changes in debt level for Indonesian
MNCs are negatively affected by the probability of bankruptcy,
firm size, and profitability. The negative effects of size and
profitability on the change in debt level support the view of the
Pecking Order Theory. However, for domestic companies, none
of the determinants has a significant effect on the change in debt
level. We also find that: (1) only size has a negative influence on
the change in debt level when we include all interactive terms in
the model; (2) if we include one interactive variable at a time, the
probability of bankruptcy, firm size, and profitability have
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negative influences on the change in debt level; in addition, a
positive impact of agency problems on the change in debt level
is more pronounced for MNCs compared to DCs. Overall, we
conclude that multinationality affects the relationship between
agency problems and the change in debt level.
Introduction
Globalization induces multinational
firms (henceforth MNCs) to conduct
foreign direct investments (FDIs) in
developing countries such as Cambo-
dia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philip-
pines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Econo-
mists consider an FDI to be a major
driving force for economic growth. It
contributes to national economic mea-
sures, such as Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP), Gross Fixed Capital For-
mation (total investment in a host
economy), and balance of payments
(Nugroho and DTE 2006). They also
argue that an FDI promote develop-
ment since it could provide sources of
new technologies, processes, products,
organizational systems, and manage-
ment skills to the host country or firms
that receive the investment. Further-
more, it may provide a company with
new markets and marketing channels,
cheaper production facilities, and an
access to new technologies, products,
skills and financing.
According to the Investment Co-
ordinating Board, the net value of FDIs
(the inflows of FDIs minus the out-
flows) in Indonesia after the crisis in
1998, as shown in Table 1, tend to
decrease even though the growth rates
were positive in 2002 and 2004
(Tambunan 2006). However, the num-
ber of new FDI projects is greater than
that of new projects funded by domes-
tic investments, as shown in Figure 1.
Thus, the role of FDIs is more impor-
tant in direct investments than domes-
tic investments (see Figure 1). Based
on the growth of MNCs in Indonesia, it
is an empirical issue to investigate how
financing decisions made by MNCs
differ from those made by domestic
firms (henceforth DCs); in other words,
it is compelling to examine whether
multinationality affects the debt financ-
ing decision. Studying the effect of
multinationality in Indonesia matters
because previous studies show that:
(1) MNCs have relatively larger size,
lower cash flow volatility, and a better
access to international capital markets
(Mitto and Zhang 2008), and (2) coun-
try-specific factors have a strong influ-
ence on the firm’s capital structure
(e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995).
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Table 1. The Net Values of Foreign Direct  Investment Flows  to  Indonesia
during  Years  1990-2004  (in  Million  USD)
Year Value
1998 -0.356
1999 -2.745
2000 -4.550
2001 -2.978
2002 0.145
2003 -0.597
2004 0.423
Year Value
1990 1.093
1991 1.482
1992 1.777
1993 2.004
1994 2.109
1995 4.346
1996 6.194
1997 4.667
Source: Bank Indonesia (The Indonesia Central Bank) : Indonesia Financial Statistics,
several sequential publication until February 2005, in Tambunan (2006).
Note: The Foreign Direct Investment Inflow including Privatization of State-Owned
Enterprise to foreign parties and bank restructuring, mainly the  selling of bank
assets to foreign investor.
Figure 1.The  Growth  of  Total  Foreign  Direct  Investment  Projects  and
Total  Domestic  Investment  Projects  Approved  by  the  Indone-
sian  Investment  Coordinating  Board
Source: Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal or BKPM (2004) in Tambunan (2006)
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Michael and Shaked (1986) de-
fine MNC as a firm with foreign sales
of at least 20 percent of its total income,
and that invests its capital at least in six
countries. In general, the business ac-
tivities of an MNC are coordinated by
a holding firm located in its country of
origin (Yuliati and Prasetyo 1998).
Eiteman et al. (2007) argue that MNCs
should be able to maintain the optimal
debt ratio to finance their operations
due to their abilities to undertake inter-
national diversification. However, some
factors, such as agency problems, the
possibility of bankruptcy, profitability
and firm size, could also affect the debt
levels of MNCs.
Burgman (1996) finds that the
agency problems of MNCs are higher
than those of DCs, thereby reducing
their leverage. MNCs have larger au-
dit costs, higher cultural differences,
higher political risks, and different ac-
counting systems. Consequently, in-
vestors are faced with high asymmet-
ric information and agency costs. As a
result, the agency problems are
strengthened in MNCs compared to in
DCs.
Furthermore, in contrast to DCs
which operate in a single country, MNCs
are affiliated with other firms in differ-
ent countries. This has created an op-
portunity for the MNCs to reduce the
bankruptcy risk on account of their
abilities to diversify their businesses.
Therefore, the lower bankruptcy risk
should reduce the cost of debt and
increase the capability of debt pay-
ment. Hence, the likelihood of MNCs’
bankruptcies has a negative influence
on the debt financing (Doukas and
Pantzalis 1997).
Other factors that are found to
influence the capital structure decision
are firm size and profitability (Rajan
and Zingales 1995). Firms with larger
size have more asymmetric informa-
tion, so they will bear higher cost of
debt when they seek the debt financing
through the capital markets. The size
of MNCs is expected to be larger than
that of DCs; accordingly, the leverage
of MNCs is estimated to be lower than
that of DCs.
On the other hand, Copeland,
Weston, and Shastri (2005) and Fama
and French (2002) find that higher
corporate profits cause firms to rely
more on retained earnings than debt to
finance their investment activities.
Therefore, MNCs with higher profit-
ability would be able to rely on retained
earnings instead of debt.
Based on the discussion above,
this study aims at answering the fol-
lowing questions:
1) Is there any influence of agency
problems, the probability of bank-
ruptcy, firm size, and profitability on
the change in debt level?
2) Is there any effect of multinationality
(i.e., MNCs or DCs) on the rela-
tionship between agency problems,
the probability of bankruptcy, firm
size, profitability, and the change in
debt level?
Heretofore, most studies con-
ducted in Indonesia investigated the
determinants of debt level without dis-
tinguishing the multinationality status
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designs, including sample selection and
data collection. Section 4 provides
empirical tests, and section 5 discusses
our conclusion.
Theoretical Framework and
Hypotheses Development
The Influences of Agency
Problems, the Probability of
Bankruptcy, Firm Size, and
Profitability on the Change in
Debt Level
Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen
(1986) state that excess free cash
flows2 raise the conflict of interests
between stockholders and managers.
Managers tend to invest excess funds
below the cost of capital or spend them
for personal gains, such as manage-
ment perks, rather than distribute them
as dividends to stockholders. Thus,
higher free cash flows are positively
associated with more severe agency
problems, as manifested by the conflict
of interests between the principal
(stockholders) and the agent (manag-
ers).
Jensen and Meckling (1976, 1986,
1989); Stulz (1990); Maloney et al.
(1993) explain that debt can be used to
reduce the conflict of interests be-
tween stockholders and management.
In other words, the debt also provides
management disciplines (Rubin 1990).
The periodic payment of interest and
(e.g., Tahirman 2000; Purba 2001; and
Permana 2005). On the other hand,
empirical studies in international set-
tings which examine the debt levels of
MNCs are numerous (e.g., Michael
and Shaked 1986; Lee and Kwok 1988;
Burgman 1996; and Chkir and Chosset
2001). In Indonesia, these studies are
relatively rare (e.g., Kusuma 1999;
Vera et al. 2005). In contrast to previ-
ous research in Indonesia, this study:
(1) investigates the determinants of
changes in debt levels of MNCs com-
pared to those of DCs; (2) directly
compares the differences in the deter-
minants of changes in debt levels be-
tween MNCs and DCs in a single
regression model with an interaction
variable, which acknowledges the in-
fluence of multinationality on the rela-
tionship between the determinant fac-
tors (i.e., agency problems, the prob-
ability of bankruptcy, firm size, and
profitability) and the change in debt
level; (3) has two objectives, i.e., to
investigate the determinant factors of
the change in debt level without consid-
ering multinationality and to investigate
the change in debt level after taking
multinationality into account. There-
fore, the contribution of this research is
to extend the scope of previous studies
in determining the change in debt level
in Indonesia based on multinationality.
The paper is organized as follows.
In section 2, we provide theoretical
framework and develop hypotheses.
In section 3, we elaborate on research
2 Excess free cash flows are cash flows in excess of that required to fund all projects that have
positive NPVs.
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principal of debt should limit the flex-
ibility of management to use free cash
flows for self-interested behavior (Con-
trol Hypothesis). Furthermore, default
on the interest payment can result in
management losing their jobs (Threat
Hypothesis).
Several empirical studies corrobo-
rate the self-interested behavior of
managers in making capital structure
decisions to avoid the disciplinary roles
of debt, for instances, increasing
management’s shareholding tends to
reduce debt to equity ratio (Friend et al.
1988), or entrenched CEOs make ef-
forts to stay away from debt, and
gearing ratios remain lower in the ab-
sence of demand from owners (Berger
et al. 1997). Accordingly, debt reduces
the agency cost of free cash flows by
reducing the cash flows available for
spending at the discretion of managers
(Stulz 1990; Harris and Raviv 1991;
and Doukas and Pantzalis 2003).
Hence, greater agency problems
will encourage firms to increase the
use of debt to control for potential
conflict of interests between share-
holders and managers.
HI.1: Agency problems are posi-
tively related to the change in
debt level.
Altman (1968), Douglas and
Finnerty (1997), and Akhtar and Oliver
(2009) find that the probability of bank-
ruptcy has a negative influence on the
change in debt level. A firm that has a
high level of possibility of bankruptcy
would be difficult to get financing from
debt as its cash flows are deemed not
sufficient to pay the interest and princi-
pal of debt. In the trade-off theory,
capital structure decisions of firms de-
pend on benefits and costs of using
more debt. Less debt is used if the cost
of bankruptcy is higher than the tax
shield benefit or other benefits from
using more debt (Kim and Sorensen
1986; Graham 2000). Therefore, firms
with a high likelihood of bankruptcy will
reduce the use of debt.
HI.2: The possibility of bankruptcy
is negatively related to the
change in debt level
Rajan and Zingales (1995) state
that there is a negative relationship
between debt and firm size since infor-
mational asymmetries among insiders
in a firm and the capital markets are
lower for large firms. So, large firms
should be more capable of issuing
informationally sensitive securities like
equity, thereby having lower debt. Con-
sequently, a large firm will rely on
retained earnings to finance its invest-
ment activities; when it raises external
financing, it will prefer equity rather
than debt (Graham 2000; Tong and
Green 2005). In other words, the in-
crease in firm size will induce the firm
to rely more on retained earnings or
equity issuance and to reduce the use
of debt.
HI.3: Firm size is negatively related
to the change in debt level.
In accordance with the pecking
order theory, the higher the profitability
of firms, the more likely the firms rely
on retained earnings. This is because
external financing through the capital
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markets requires high disclosure and
transparency of information due to the
existence of asymmetric information
(Myers and Majluf 1984). This implies
that profitable firms will retain earnings
and become less levered whereas un-
profitable firms will borrow and be-
come more levered, thus creating a
negative relation between profitability
and the probability that external financ-
ing is raised. This argument is also
supported by Rajan and Zingales (1995),
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and
Fama and French (2002), who find that
profitability is negatively related to debt
ratio. Thus, an increase in profitability
will cause a firm to rely more on re-
tained earnings, and consequently the
use of debt will be lower.
HI.4: Profitability is negatively re-
lated to the change in debt
level.
The Influence of
Multinationality on the
Relationship of Agency
Problems, the Probability of
Bankruptcy, Firm Size, and
Profitability to the Change in
Debt Level
In this section, the first four hy-
potheses are not different from those
developed in the previous section. This
section focuses on the influence of
multinationality on the relationship of
agency problems, the possibility of
bankruptcy, profitability, and firm size
to the change in debt level.
As mentioned earlier, MNCs with
operations in many countries have vari-
ous advantages, such as international
diversification. MNCs can reduce the
cost of capital and are more resilient to
face an unfavorable change in a coun-
try since the sources of their operating
cash flows are not concentrated only in
one country (Eiteman et al. 2007). Sing
and Nejadmalayeri (2004) find that
international diversification is positively
associated with higher leverage for the
sample of French corporations. Mean-
while, Mittoo and Zhang (2008) pro-
vide evidence that Canadian MNCs
have higher leverage relative to Cana-
dian DCs. This is also substantiated by
Vera et al. (2005), who find that MNCs
have more debt than do DCs. Thus,
MNCs should experience a higher
change in debt level compared to DCs
due to their relatively lower cash flow
volatility and easier access to interna-
tional capital markets.
HII.5: The change in debt level for
MNCs is higher than that for
DCs.
Burgman (1996) and Vera et al.
(2005) state that MNCs are faced with
higher auditing costs, language differ-
ences, sovereignty uncertainties, and
varying legal and accounting systems.
In addition, their investors are con-
fronted with wider informational gaps
and higher costs of investigation. Hence,
MNCs are likely to face significantly
higher monitoring costs than DCs, and
consequently suffer from higher agency
problems than do DCs. Similarly, oth-
ers argue that the agency costs of
MNCs are higher than those of DCs
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since they are more difficult to monitor
due to increased complexity and geo-
graphic diversity (Aggarwal and Kyaw
2010). Consequently, because the
agency problems of MNCs are ex-
pected to be higher than those of DCs,
a higher debt level will be needed to
mitigate the agency problems (Jensen
and Meckling 1976, 1986, 1989; Stulz
1990; Maloney et al. 1993; Rubin 1990).
Therefore, we expect that the positive
relation between agency problems and
the change in debt level is stronger for
MNCs than DCs.
HII.6: The positive relation between
agency problems and the
change in debt level is more
pronounced for MNCs com-
pared to DCs.
The possibility of bankruptcy of
MNCs is expected to be lower than
that of DCs as MNCs operate in vari-
ous countries which are not perfectly
correlated and giving rise to diversifi-
cation opportunities for the MNCs.
Consequently, the overall cash flows
of MNCs will be more stable, thereby
reducing the probability of bankruptcy
and increasing the ability of debt fi-
nancing (Shapiro 1978 in Lee and Kwok
1988). The argument of more stable
MNCs’ cash flows compared to DCs’
is also corroborated by Burgman (1996)
and Eiteman, Stonehill, and Moffett
(2007). The main rationales are: (1)
MNCs have a range of revenues not
only from the country of origin, thereby
increasing cash flows available for debt
payment and (2) MNCs have a better
ability to manage and hedge against ex-
change rate risk. Furthermore, Doukas
and Pantzalis (2003) also argue that
since the operations of MNCs are
industrially and geographically diversi-
fied, the business and financial risks of
MNCs are expected to be lower in
comparison to those of DCs. Hence, it
suggests that financial distress for
MNCs should be relatively low, leading
to reduced cost of debt and rising
MNCs’ leverage. Therefore, the nega-
tive relationship between the possibility
of bankruptcy and the change in debt
level should be stronger for MNCs
than DCs.
HII.7: The negative impact of the
possibility of bankruptcy on
the change in debt level is
stronger for MNCs than DCs.
Based on the definition of MNC
by Michael and Shaked (1986) and
Rajan and Zingales (1995), which have
been described previously, MNCs have
subsidiaries at least in six countries.
Accordingly, the size of MNCs is larger
than that of local firms. Consequently,
if size is a proxy for financial informa-
tion, outside investors should prefer
equity relative to debt, and size should
result in a lower change in debt level for
MNCs.
This argument is also supported
by Doukas and Pantzalis (2003), argu-
ing that since MNCs are larger firms
with a greater internal capital market
advantage, they will have more re-
sources available to undertake new
investment projects, and therefore size
should be inversely related to the use of
debt.
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HII.8: The negative relationship be-
tween firm size and the change
in debt level is stronger for
MNCs than DCs.
Previous studies show that MNCs
have a better opportunity than do DCs
to earn more profit mainly due to hav-
ing an access to more than one source
of earnings and a better chance to have
favorable business conditions in par-
ticular countries (Kogut 1985; Barlett
and Ghoshal 1989). Therefore, accord-
ing to the pecking order theory, MNCs
rely more on retained earnings rather
than external financing such as debt to
finance their operational activities
(Burgman 1996). In other words, the
use of MNCs’ debt will decline be-
cause MNCs have higher profitability
than do DCs, and will rely more on
retained earnings instead of debt.
HII.9: The negative relationship
between profitability and the
change in debt level will be
stronger for MNCs than DCs.
Research Sample
Sample
The unit of analysis is the listed
companies on the Indonesian Stock
Exchange, both domestic and multina-
tional corporations. Observation pe-
riod is from 2001 to 2005. Data are
taken from the OSIRIS database.
To be included in the sample, cri-
teria that must be met are: (1) the firms
must be included in the Osiris database
(Bureau Van Djiek); (2) the firms are
in the manufacturing sector, and are
classified as multinational firms or do-
mestic firms based on the definition of
Michael and Shaked (1986),2 and (3)
the firms’ financial data are available in
Osiris.
The firms that operated until the
end of 2005 amounted to 329 firms,
either MNCs or DCs, but the numbers
of firms that meet the criteria are 48
firms as MNCs and 33 firms as DCs.
Thus, this study uses 81 firms over five
years, a total of 405 observations.
Definitions of Operational
Variables
In accordance with the descrip-
tion given in the earlier literature, the
operational definitions of research vari-
ables are as follows. Corporate debt is
measured by the change in debt-to-
asset ratio (DAR). We measure le-
verage using the term used by Lee and
Kwok (1988), Burgman (1996), Chen
et al. (1997), Chkir and Cosset (2001).
Debt-to-asset ratio and its change are
given as follows.
2 We also recheck the MNCs classification based on the following site: id.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Perusahaan_multinasional; and wrightreports.ecnext.com/coms2/reportdesc_COMPANY
DAR= ....(1)
Long Term Debt
(Long Term Debt + Market Value
Equity)
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where DAR
t
 is the debt-to-asset ratio
in year t; DAR
t-1
 is the debt-to-asset
ratio in previous year t-1.
The proxy for agency problems
utilized in this study is free cash flow to
the firm (FCFF) to total assets. As
mentioned previously, free cash flow is
cash flow in excess of that required to
fund all projects that have positive
NPV. Jensen (1986) argues that even
though managers invest in all available
positive net-present-value projects, they
tend to use the surplus cash for their
own utility rather than disgorging the
cash to shareholders. Because the self-
interested behavior of managers in-
duces them to hoard and misuse free
cash flows, the agency problem mani-
fests itself through the expansion of
firm size, thereby increasing the man-
agers’ control and personal remunera-
tion even though their actions may
reduce the overall firm value. There-
fore, firms with high FCFs face more
severe agency problems in the sense
that higher FCFs provide an opportu-
nity for managers to engage in “value
destroying activities” such as increas-
ing their perquisites, shirking, and in-
vesting in negative NPV projects. For
example, Jensen (1986) shows that in
the 1970s and early 1980s, the oil indus-
try earned windfall profits but instead
of paying them out to the shareholders,
management spent heavily on explora-
tion and development activities even
though the projects’ returns were be-
low the cost of capital. Furthermore,
the condition worsened when manage-
ment also decided to invest in unrelated
businesses (diversification) that fur-
ther reduced shareholder wealth. Sec-
ond, Jensen (1993 in Brush et al. 2000)
demonstrates that GM, IBM, and
Eastman Kodak in 1980s made mas-
sive unprofitable investments out of
FCFs in industries with excess capac-
ity. Using the sample of larger firms, he
finds that these firms have inefficien-
cies in capital expenditures and R&D
spending decisions that cause the firms
to earn returns below those on market-
able securities. This empirical finding
proves that managers tend to hoard the
free cash flows rather than distributing
them to shareholders since their com-
pensation depends on the firm’s growth,
and accordingly they are encouraged
to overinvest in cash or capital expen-
ditures. Several empirical findings cor-
roborate this evidence. Free Cash Flow
Theory, e.g., Rajan et al. (2000), as-
serts that firms having large amount of
free cash flows are inclined to engage
more in corporate diversification that
reduces firm value. Weisbach (1988),
Christie and Zimmerman (1994), and
Gul (2001) show that agency problems
in high FCF firms manifest in the choice
of FIFO inventory method in order to
increase operating income. This non-
value maximizing behavior purports to
attain higher compensation and secure
their jobs. Therefore, based on previ-
ous empirical studies (e.g., Jensen 1986;
Weibach 1988; Lehn and Poulsen 1989;
Agrawal and Jayaraman 1994; Christie
DAR= ... (2)
DAR
t
 - DAR
t-1
DAR
t-1
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and Zimmerman 1994; Rajan et al.
2000; Gul 2001; Kim and Lee 2003),
we employ a proxy for the agency
problem as follows:
While free cash flow is calculated
using the following formula:
where:
t = year t
t-1 = year t-1
FCFF
t
= Free Cash Flow to the Firm
EAT
t
= Earnings after Tax
Depr
t
= Depreciation
Capex
t
= Capital Expenditures
NW
t
= Net Working Capital in year
t
NW
t-1
= Net Working Capital in year
t-1
The probability of bankruptcy is
measured by the Z-Score, which is a
multidimensional measure for bank-
ruptcy formulated by Altman (1968)
based on the financial ratios of a firm.
The value above 2.99 reflects the lower
probability of financial distress while
the value below 1.80 indicates the higher
probability of financial distress. We
use this measurement due to two rea-
sons. First, in Indonesia, the empirical
study to test the predictive ability of the
Altman’s Z-score (Altman 1968) was
conducted by Hadad et al. (2003).
Their sample included 32 listed compa-
nies on the Jakarta Stock Exchange
(i.e., it consisted of 16 companies still
active on the stock exchange and 16
companies already delisted from the
stock exchange) over 1999-2002. The
result shows that Altman’s Z-score
has predictive power (see Table 2).
The predictive accuracy is greater than
70 percent (i.e., 74.5% accuracy rate
of three years, 77.3% accuracy rate of
two years, and 78.1% accuracy rate of
one year prior to bankruptcy.) Second,
Pongsatat et al. (2004) investigate the
comparative ability of Ohslon’s Logit
Model and Altman’s Z-Score Model
for predicting the bankruptcies of large
and small firms in Thailand. A matched
pair sample of 60 bankrupt and 60 non-
bankrupt firms were examined over
the years 1998-2003. They conclude
that while each of the two methods has
a predictive ability when applied to
Thai firms, there is no significant dif-
ference in respective predictive abili-
ties of Altman’s (1968) model and
Ohlson’s (1980) model, either for large-
asset or for small-asset Thai firms.
Hence, even though the Altman’s Z-
score raises critiques about the selec-
tion of the relatively best financial ra-
tios to detect the probability of bank-
ruptcy and how much weight should be
given to each of the chosen financial
ratio, the above studies show that this
measurement has a relatively good
predictive ability.
Agency Problem= ... (3)
(FCFF)
Total Assets
FCFF
t
= EAT
t
 + Depr
t
- Capex
t
 - (NW
t
 - NW
t-1
)
.................................(4)
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The measurement of Altman’s Z-
score is given by the following formula.
Further, firm size is measured by
the log of total assets (Titman and
Wessels 1988; Rajan and Zingales 1995;
Lee and Kwok 1988; Burgman 1996;
Che et al. 1997; Doukas and Pantzalis
1997), and the profitability of firm is
measured by return on assets (ROA)
as defined by Doukas and Pantzalis
(2003). The formulae of the two mea-
sures are given respectively as follows:
Data Analysis
This study uses two models. The
first model is to analyze capital struc-
ture determinants regardless of
multinationality. On the other hand, the
second model is relevant to identifying
the significance of capital structure
determinants of MNCs relative to DCs.
We utilize the dichotomous variable
and dichotomous interaction variables
for multinationality. The relationship
among research variables are summa-
rized in Figures 2 and 3. We employ the
method of Pooled Least Squares (PLS),
Fixed Effects Model (FEM), and Ran-
dom Effects Model (REM) to examine
both models.
Both models reveal a row in the
following regression formula.
Table 2. The  Comparison  of  Correct  Estimates  between  Output  Discrimi-
nant  Analysis  and  Logistic  Regression
Correct  Estimates Discriminant  (%) Logistics  (%)
3 years before bankrupt 74.5 80.99
2 years before bankrupt 77.3 85.54
1 year before bankrupt 78.1 86.72
Source: Hadad et.al 2003
SIZE= Log (Total Asssets)....(6)
ROA=                       ...........(7)
Net Income
Total Assets
Z= 3.3                  +
1.2                        +
1.0                 +
0.6                             +
1.4
......................................(4)
Net Working Capital
Total Assets
Sales
Total Assets
Market Value of Equity
Book Value of Debt
EBIT
Total Assets
Accumulated Retained Eranings
Total Assets
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where:
i =  firm i,
t = year t,
DAR = Change in debt to total
assets ratio,
(FCFF/TA)
it
= Free cash flows to
Total assets,
Z-SCORE
it
= Altman’s Z-score,
Log (TA)
it
= Log of total assets.
Figure 2. The  Relationships  among  Research  Variables  in  Model  1
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Figure 3. The  Relationships  among  Research  Variables  in  Model  II
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Results
Descriptive Analysis
Predicated on the results of de-
scriptive statistics in Table 3, we pro-
vide evidence that MNCs have an
average change in debt level of 1.11,
which is higher than that of DCs (0.85).
We employ the t-test for equality means
to examine the mean difference of the
changes in debt levels of both firms as
shown in Table 4.
Based on Table 4, the average
change in MNCs’ debt level is not
significantly different from that of DC.
This result is not consistent with the
hypothesis II.5, i.e., the change in
MNCs’ debt level is higher than that of
DCs. However, a regression analysis
is needed to confirm this hypothesis
further.
Furthermore, Pearson correlation
analysis as shown in Table 5 depicts
several findings. First, Z-score value is
positively related to ÄDAR (p-value =
0.000). Higher Z-score value implies a
lower probability of default, thereby
increasing the change in debt level.
Second, log (TA) is negatively related
to DAR (p-value = 0.005). Thus, firm
size is negatively related to the change
in debt level. Third, DFCFF is posi-
tively related to DAR (p-value =
0.047). Therefore, a positive relation-
ship between agency problems and the
change in debt level becomes stronger
for MNCs. Fourth, DZSCORE is posi-
tively related to ÄDAR (p-value =
0.000). In other words, the positive
relationship between Z-score (or the
negative relationship between the prob-
ability of bankruptcy) and the change in
debt level is stronger for MNCs.
Table 3. Descriptive  Statistics
Variable MNC DC
Mean Std Mean Std
DAR 1.11 5.93 0.85 4.98
FCFF/TA 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.12
ZSCORE 3.78 6.54 2.48 3.00
LTA 8.85 0.42 8.94 0.54
ROA 1.85 7.94 4.08 7.94
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Table 4. t-tests  for  the  Equality  of  Means  of  the  Changes  in  Debt  Level
Group  Statistics
DUMMY N Mean Std.  Deviation Std. Error Mean
DAR 1 240 1.113 5.932 .383
0 165 .853 4.976 .387
Independent  Samples  Test
Levene’s
Test for t-test for Equality of Means
Equality of
Variances
95%
Confidence
Interval of
the Difference
F Sig. t df Sig. Mean Std. Error
(1-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
Equal
variances 0.936 0.334 0.462 403 0.323 0.260 0.563 -0.846 1.366
assumed
DAR
Equal
variances 0.477 387.332 0.317 0.260 0.5446714 -0.8113 1.331
not assumed
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Tests for Models I and II
Before conducting the regression
analysis, we examine the assumptions
in the multiple linear regression. To
overcome the heteroskedasticity prob-
lem in both models, we use the White
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors and variances.
Furthermore, to see whether there
is an autocorrelation problem, we em-
ploy the Durbin-Watson (DW) test.
The Durbin-Wation (DW) value for
Model 1 is 2.33 whereas for Model 2 is
2.37. Based on the indicators used in
the DW values between -2 to +2 for the
two models, we may conclude that
both models are free from the
autocorrelation problem.
Multicollinearity tests are con-
ducted with the indicator values of VIF
(Variance Inflation Factor), and VIF
values for all variables in the two mod-
els are under 10. Thus, the model is
free from multicollinearity.
Model I Regression Analysis
The regression results for Model 1
in Table 6 show that agency problems
and profitability do not affect the change
in debt level. Accordingly, hypotheses
I.1 and I.4 are not supported.
Z-score has a positive influence
on the change in debt level, and this is
significant at 5 percent level. Because
a greater value of Z-score indicates a
lower probability of default, then the
regression result basically shows a
positive effect. This result is consistent
with hypothesis I.2, i.e., there is a
negative influence of the probability of
default on the change in debt level. As
mentioned above, the capital structure
decisions of firms depend on the ben-
efits and costs of using more debt. Less
debt is used if the cost of bankruptcy is
higher than the tax shield benefit or
other benefits of using more debt (Kim
and Sorensen 1986; Graham 2000).
Table 6. PLS Statistical Outputs for Model I
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Sig  1-tailed
C 11.507 2.122 0.017
FCFF 1.526 0.575 0.283
ZSCORE 0.260 2.131 0.017 * *
LTA -1.263 -2.116 0.018 * *
PROF -0.060 -1.112 0.133
R-squared: 0.076
Adjusted R-squared: 0.066
F-statistic: 8.168
Prob(F-statistic): 0.000 * * *
Durbin-Watson stat: 2.131
*** significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent
level
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Firm size negatively affects the
change in debt level, which is signifi-
cant at 5 percent level. Therefore, the
hypothesis I.3 is substantiated. Hence,
the result supports Rajan and Zingales
(1995) who find that informational
asymmetries among insiders in a firm
and in the capital markets are lower for
large firms. Therefore, large firms
should be more capable of issuing
informationally sensitive securities like
equity, and accordingly should have a
lower debt level.
Overall, we conclude that factors
affecting the change in debt level in
Indonesian firms without considering
the multinationality are the probability
of bankruptcy and firm size. On the
other hand, agency problems and prof-
itability do not affect the change in debt
level. In other words, hypotheses I.2
and I.3 are supported whereas hypoth-
eses I.1 and I.4 are not evidenced.
Model II Regression Analysis
The results of Model II in Table 7
show that only firm size has a negative
influence on the change in debt level,
and this is marginally significant at 10
percent level. Meanwhile, agency prob-
lems, the probability of bankruptcy, and
profitability do not affect the change in
debt level. Therefore, only hypothesis
II.3 is supported while hypotheses II.1,
II.2, and II.4 are not supported.
Table 7. PLS Statistical Outputs  for Model  II
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Sig  1-tailed
C 13.303 1.515 0.065
FCFF -0.160 -0.064 0.475
ZSCORE 0.097 0.462 0.322
LTA -1.416 -1.498 0.067 *
ROA -0.008 -0.242 0.404
DUMMY -0.792 -0.068 0.473
DFCFF 4.469 0.728 0.233
DZSCORE 0.198 0.787 0.216
DLTA 0.015 0.011 0.495
DROA        -0.107 -1.016 0.156
R-squared: 0.083
Adj. R-squared: 0.062
F : 3.978
Sig. F: 0.000 * * *
Durbin Watson: 2.133
*** significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent
level
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Previous empirical studies that in-
vestigated the capital structures of do-
mestic and multinational corporations
(e.g., Titman and Wessels 1988; Rajan
and Zingales 1995; Lee and Kwok
1988; Burgman 1996; Che, Cheng, He,
and Kim 1997; Doukas and Pantzalis
1997) controlled for size factor. As
pointed out by Rajan and Zingales
(1995) in Chkir and Cosset, the effect
of size is ambiguous. Larger firms tend
to be more diversified and therefore
are less likely to go bankrupt. This
being the case, size should have a
positive effect on leverage. However,
if size is a proxy for the financial
information, outside investors should
prefer equity relative to debt, and size
should result in a lower change in debt
level for MNCs. Based on the empiri-
cal studies on firms in Indonesia, we
conclude that size is a proxy for the
financial information, so the influence
of size on the change in debt level is
negative.
In addition, multinationality appar-
ently does not influence the change in
debt level. In other words, the change
in MNCs’ debt level is not relatively
different from that of DCs. Thus, hy-
pothesis II.5 is not substantiated. We
conclude that multinationality in Indo-
nesia does not affect leverage. Fur-
thermore, multinationality does not in-
fluence the relationship of agency prob-
lems, the probability of bankruptcy,
size, and profitability to the change in
debt level. In other words, hypotheses
II.6, II.7, II.8, and II.9 are not sup-
ported.
Sensitivity Analysis
 Alternative Statistical Tests for
Models I and II
This research uses panel data, so
the use of Pooled Least Squares (PLS)
does not consider the differences among
observations and across years since
the intercepts and the slopes of the
model are assumed to be equal. There-
fore, to accommodate the flaw of PLS,
we employ the Fixed Effects Model
(henceforth FEM) and the Random
Effects Model (henceforth REM).
The statistical outputs of FEM and
REM for Model I are shown in Tables
8 and 9. Based on PLS and REM, the
Z-score has a positive influence on the
change in debt level (significant at 5%
level for FEM and 1% level for REM)
while LTA has a negative influence
(significant at 5% level for FEM and
REM). Thus, hypotheses I.2 and I.3
are supported.
Based on the previous three mod-
els, we use the Chow test, the Hausman
test, and the Breusch-Pagan test to
determine the best prediction model.
Chow test is used to determine whether
PLS or FEM is better. The hypothesis
is stated as follows:
H0: Use Common / Pooled Least
Squares (PLS)
H1: Use Fixed Effects Model (FEM)
Meanwhile, Hausman test is uti-
lized to decide on whether REM or
FEM model is better. The hypothesis is
stated as follows:
H0: Use Random Effects Model
(REM)
H1: Use Fixed Effects Model (FEM)
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Table 8. The  Statistical  Outputs  of  Fixed  Effects  Model  and  Random
Effects  Model  for  Model  I
Variable Fixed Effects Model (FEM) Random Effects Model (REM)
Coeff. t-stat. Sig 1-tailed Coeff. t-stat. Sig 1-tailed
C 16.932 1.931 0.027 11.507 2.118 0.017
FCFF 3.700 1.233 0.109 1.526 0.710 0.239
ZSCORE 0.231 2.020 0.022 * * 0.260 2.708 0.004 * * *
LTA -1.866 -1.866 0.031 * * -1.263 -2.082 0.019 * *
ROA -0.069 -1.224 0.111 -0.060 -1.112 0.133
R-squared: 0.198 R-squared          : 0.076
Adj. R-squared: 0.027 Adj. R-squared: 0.066
F: 1.156 F: 8.168
Sig. F: 0.201 Sig. F: 0.000 * * *
Durbin Watson: 2.182 Durbin Watson: 1.893
*** significant at 1  percent level
** significant at 5  percent level
* significant at 10  percent level
Table 9. Summary of Coefficient Signs for PLS, FEM, and REM Tests for
Model  I
Expected Fixed Random
Coefficient PLS Effect  Model Effect  Model
(FEM) (REM)
Variable DDAR DDAR DDAR DDAR
FCFF + - - -
ZSCORE +a +** +** +***
LTA - -** -** -**
ROA - - - -
a Because higher z-score value shows lower likelihood probability of default then the influence
of z-score to change in debt level is positive. This does not imply contradiction to hypothesis stated
above, i.e. the higher likelihood probability of default so the change in debt level will be lower.
*** significant at 1  percent level
** significant at 5  percent level
* significant at 10  percent level
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The output statistics of Chow test
in Table 10 show that the p-value for
the cross-section F is 0.9157, thereby
concluding that the PLS model is better
than the FEM. Meanwhile, Hausman
test in Table 11 describes that the p-
value for the cross-section random is
1.0000; accordingly, the REM model is
found to be better than the FEM.
Furthermore, we conduct the
Breusch-Pagan test to examine whether
REM is better than PLS. Based on
Greene (1993) and Lloyd, Morrissey,
and Osei (2008), the Breusch-Pagan
test examines whether there is varia-
tion within groups in the random ef-
fects model. The hypotheses given are
H
0
 : 

= 0, and H
1
: otherwise. The
statistical test is given as follows:
where u
it
 is the residual of regression
of x
it
 on y
it.
 This statistic is distributed
as a chi-squared with the degree of
freedom of one. If H
0 
is accepted, then
we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the slope coefficient of REM does not
diverge from that of PLS (
GLS
= 
OLS
).
Based on the PLS residuals, the result
obtained by the Breusch-Pagan test
statistics for Model I is as follows:
< <
405 (5) 1.427 x 10-24
2 (3 - 1) 11534.98
-1  = 506.25
2
Table  10. Chow Test for Model I
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Pool: FEM1
Test cross-section fixed effects
Effects  Test Statistic d.f.  Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.757643 (67,333) 0.9157
Cross-section Chi-square 57.461491 67 0.7906
Table  11.  Hausman  Test  for  Model  I
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Pool: REM1
Test cross-section random effects
Test  Summary Chi-Sq.  Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section random 0.000000 4 1.0000
B=                                - 1
B
2 (T-1)
 (u
it
)2
 u2
it
<
i t
<
i t
2
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Critical values of 5 percent and 1
percent of the chi-squared distribution
with one degree of freedom are 3.842
and 6.635, respectively. Accordingly,
they are statistically significant at 5
percent and 1 percent levels, respec-
tively. Therefore, we conclude that
REM is better than PLS model. How-
ever, based on previous discussion, the
result of REM is not different from that
of PLS, i.e., Z-score has a positive
influence on the change in debt level
whereas size has a negative influence
on the change in debt level. Hence, we
confirm hypotheses I.2 and I.3.
The tests of FEM and REM are
also conducted for Model II, but the
statistical test for FEM cannot be run
as the statistical output shows a near
singular matrix. Meanwhile, the result
of REM in Table 12 shows that size has
a negative effect on the change in debt
level, and it is significant at 10 percent
level. Furthermore, we employ the
Breusch-Pagan test to determine
whether PLS or REM is better.
Based on the PLS residuals, the
result obtained by the Breusch-Pagan
test statistic for Model II is as follows:
405 (5) 1.427 x 10-25
2 (3 - 1) 11440.39
-1  = 506.25
2
Table 12. The Statistical  Outputs of REM  Test  for  Model  II
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Sig  1-tailed
C 13.303 1.496 0.068
FCFF -0.160 -0.088 0.465
ZSCORE 0.097 0.924 0.178
LTA -1.416 -1.457 0.073 *
ROA -0.008 -0.263 0.396
DUMMY -0.792 -0.077 0.470
DFCFF 4.469 0.969 0.167
DZSCORE 0.198 1.091 0.138
DLTA 0.015 0.013 0.495
DROA -0.107 -0.941 0.174
R-squared: 0.083
Adj. R-squared: 0.062
F: 3.978
Sig. F: 0.000***
Durbin Watson: 1.883
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We thus conclude that REM is
better than PLS, but the significances
of coefficients as summarized in Table
13 are low, indicating that only size has
a negative influence on the change in
debt level. Multinationality in fact does
not affect the change in debt level and
the determinants of the change in debt
level.
Overall, when we exclude the
multinationality variable from the model,
the coefficients on Z-score and size
are significantly positive and negative,
respectively, while the coefficient on
agency problems and profitability are
not significantly different from zero.
Therefore, in general the change in
debt level is negatively affected by the
probability of bankruptcy and size.
However, when we include the multi-
nationality and its interaction with the
determinants in the regression, the prob-
ability of bankruptcy turns out to be
insignificant whereas size remains sig-
nificant.
The Determinants of the Change
in Debt Level for MNCs and DCs
Based on Model I, we use the full
sample of both MNCs and DCs to
analyze the determinants of capital
structure for Indonesian firms in gen-
Table 13. Summary of Coefficient Signs for PLS and REM for Model II
Expected Fixed Random
Coefficient PLS Effect  Model Effect  Model
(FEM) (REM)
Variable DDAR DDAR DDAR DDAR
FCFF + - - -
FCFF + - -
ZSCORE + + +
LTA - -* -*
ROA - - -
Dummy + - -
DFCFF + + +
DZSCORE +a + +
DLTA - + +
DROA - - -
a Because higher z-score value shows lower likelihood probability of default then the interaction
variable betweeen dummy variable and z-score is positive. The argumentation is MNCs expected
to have a lower probability of bankruptcy than DCs.
*** significant at 1  percent level
** significant at 5  percent level
* significant at 10  percent level
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eral. In this section, we examine the
capital structure determinants for
MNCs and DCs separately using REM.
The results in Table 12 show that when
the sample is divided into MNCs and
DCs, significant differences in the de-
terminants appear. For MNCs, the re-
sults show that: (1) Z-score has a
positive influence on the change in debt
level (significant at 1% level); (2) size
has a negative influence on the change
in debt level (significant at 10% level);
and (3) profitability has a negative
influence on the change in debt level
(significant at 5% level). Therefore,
hypotheses I.2, I.3, and I.4 are sub-
stantiated. On the contrary, for DCs
none of the independent variables is
significant in determining the change in
debt level. Although these results show
that the determinants of capital struc-
ture in Indonesia differ, depending upon
whether the firm is a domestic or a
multinational corporation, the results
do not directly indicate if the influences
of the determinants are significantly
different between MNCs and DCs.
The next test (Model 2) attempts to do
this by combining MNCs and DCs in
one regression, and examines if the
coefficients on independent variables
are significantly different between
MNCs and DCs.
Table 14. The Determinants of Changes in Debt Level for MNCs and DCs
MNC DC
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Sig 1-tailed Coeff. t-stat. Sig 1-tailed
C 12.511 1.554 0.061 13.303 1.956 0.026
FCFF 4.309 1.057 0.146 -0.160 -0.045 0.482
ZSCORE 0.294 4.612 0.000 * * * 0.097 0.684 0.248
LTA -1.401 -1.541 0.063 * -1.416 -1.869 0.032 * *
PROF -0.115 -1.837 0.034 * * -0.008 -0.135 0.447
R-squared: 0.108 R-squared: 0.029
Adjusted R-squared: 0.093 Adjusted R-squared: 0.005
F-statistic: 7.135 F-statistic: 1.212
Prob(F-statistic): 0.000 * * * Prob(F-statistic): 0.308
Durbin-Watson stat: 2.126 Durbin-Watson stat: 2.146
*** significant at 1  percent level
** significant at 5  percent level
* significant at 10  percent level
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The Determinants of the Change
in Debt Level with Each Individual
Interactive Variable
We also conduct an analysis of
including an interactive term MNC*X
into the regression, where X repre-
sents each individual change in debt
level determinant in the regression. So,
we test separate regressions that in-
clude one interactive variable at a time
using the REM. Based on results in
Table 15, we find that: (1) Z-score has
Table 15. The  Determinants  of  Change  in  Debt  Level  by  Including  an
Interactive  Variable  at  a  Time
Independent Dependent  Variable  :  DDAR
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 12.048 12.867 10.753 11.809
(0.025)** (0.013)** (0.130) (0.026)**
FCFF 0.220 1.822 1.636 1.690
(0.446) (0.199) (0.239) (0.224)
ZSCORE 0.261 0.115 0.267 0.272
(0.002)*** (0.148) (0.003)*** (0.004)***
LTA -1.295 -1.353 -1.157 -1.287
(0.022)** (0.015)** (0.127) (0.023)**
ROA -0.066 -0.062 -0.064 -0.043
(0.103) (0.1046) (0.111) (0.094)*
Dummy -0.403 -0.783 2.016 -0.224
(0.294) (0.075) (0.436) (0.374)
DFCFF 2.670
(0.035)**
DZSCORE 0.169
(0.165)
DLTA -0.265
(0.422)
DROA -0.040
(0.287)
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.065 0.063 0.063
Prob(F-Statistic) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
*** significant at 1  percent level; ** significant at 5  percent level; * significant
at 10  percent level
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a positive influence on the change in
debt level, and it is significant at 1
percent level in three out of four equa-
tions; (2) size has a negative influence
on the change in debt level, and it is
significant at 5 percent level in three
out of four equations; and (3) profitabil-
ity has a negative influence on the
change in debt level, and it is marginally
significant at 10 percent level in one out
of four equations. Meanwhile, the
change in debt level is not influenced by
the multinationality since the statistical
outputs of four equations show that
multinationality is not significant. Fi-
nally, only the interactive variable be-
tween multinationality and agency prob-
lems in the first equation is significant,
meaning that a positive impact of the
agency problems and the change in
debt level is more pronounced for MNCs
than DCs. It signifies that hypothesis
II.6 is supported.
Conclusion
This study aims at investigating
whether: (1) the change in debt level is
affected by agency problems, the prob-
ability of bankruptcy, size, and profit-
ability; (2) the change in debt level is
influenced by multinationality (i.e.,
MNCs or DCs), and (3) there is an
influence of multinationality on the re-
lationship of agency problems, the prob-
ability of bankruptcy, size, and profit-
ability to the change in debt level.
The results of this study provide
evidence that in general the change in
debt level is negatively affected by the
probability of default (thereby posi-
tively affected by Z-score) and also
negatively affected by size. However,
when the sample is divided between
MNCs and DCs, the results show that
the change in debt level for MNCs is
positively influenced by Z-score but
negatively influenced by size and prof-
itability. Meanwhile, for DCs none of
the variables significantly affects the
change in debt level.
The results of the second model
indicate that only size has a negative
influence on the change in debt level.
Meanwhile, multinationality does not
affect the change in debt level and the
relationship of agency problems, prob-
ability of default, size, and profitability
to the change in debt level. Neverthe-
less, when we run a separate regres-
sion which includes an interactive vari-
able at a time, the results show that the
probability of default has a positive
influence on the change in debt level (in
three out of four equations), size has a
negative influence on the change in
debt level (in three out of four equa-
tions), and profitability has a negative
influence on the change in debt level (in
one out of four equations). In fact, in
the first equation, we find that the
positive impact of agency problems on
the change in debt level is more pro-
nounced for MNCs than DCs.
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